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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(j) (1988). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in 
admitting into evidence the testimony of Rebecca Helms, Jody 
Christensen and Colleen Mark, particularly where the court had 
previously and correctly ruled such testimony inadmissible? 
a. Whether the original Order in Limine excluding the 
prior and subsequent slip and fall accidents was a correct ruling 
of law? 
b. Whether the admission of such testimony on the 
very last day of trial constituted surprise which ordinary 
prudence could not have guarded against, and thus prejudiced 
Wasatch's defense. 
2. Whether the trial court committed reversible error 
by giving Jury Instruction No. 20 over the objection of counsel 
for Wasatch Manor, Inc., causing the jury to improperly apply a 
higher standard of care to Wasatch Manor, Inc.? 
3. Whether the court committed reversible error by 
refusing to grant Wasatch Manor, Inc.'s Motion for a New Trial? 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, 
ordinances, rules, or regulations whose interpretation would 
determine the issues at hand. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This action was instituted by the Plaintiff-
Respondent, Guy Erickson, against Defendant-Appellant, Wasatch 
Manor, Inc. ("Wasatch"), who operates the Wasatch Manor 
Apartments in Salt Lake City. Erickson claimed that he was 
injured on February 9, 1985 when, while a resident of the Wasatch 
Manor Apartments, he slipped and fell on ice in the upper level 
of the Wasatch Manor Apartments parking lot. 
Prior to the trial of this action, Wasatch moved the 
trial court (Judge Homer F. Wilkinson) for an Order In Limine 
excluding from evidence the testimony of four (4) witnesses 
regarding prior and subsequent slip and fall accidents allegedly 
occurring on the Wasatch Manor Apartments parking lot. It was 
Wasatch's contention that the prior and subsequent slip and 
fall accidents were not admissible because Erickson could not 
show that they occurred under substantially similar conditions as 
his own fall. The trial court granted Wasatch's Motion In 
Limine, and ruled that the testimony would not be admissible 
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unless Erickson established that the parking structure was 
defectively designed or constructed. 
On the third and last day of trial, however, the court 
reconsidered its Order In Limine upon the Motion of Erickson's 
counsel, Eric Bjorklund. Despite the fact that Erickson had 
made no showing of a defect in the construction of the Wasatch 
Manor parking lot, the court decided to admit the testimony of 
prior and subsequent falls against the objections of counsel for 
Wasatch. 
In addition, against the objections of counsel for 
Wasatch that Jury Instruction No. 20 was an incorrect statement 
of landlord/tenant law in Utah, the court instructed the jury 
that a landlord has a duty to exercise ordinary care to maintain 
the common walkways in a reasonably safe condition for tenants 
and guests, and that a landlord has a further duty to observe any 
dangerous condition known to him and to take reasonable steps to 
remedy or remove any such dangerous condition. 
On May 19, 1989 the jury returned a verdict in favor of 
Guy Erickson, and judgment was entered on June 13, 1989. 
Thereafter, Wasatch filed a timely motion for a new trial, 
arguing that the admission of the testimony regarding the prior 
and subsequent falls constituted surprise and that the trial 
court erred in giving Jury Instruction No. 20. By Minute Entry 
dated August 7, 1989, and an Order dated September 19, 1989, 
Judge Wilkinson denied Wasatch's Motion for a New Trial. 
-3-
Appellant Wasatch Manor, Inc. filed its Notice of Appeal on 
October 19, 1989. 
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Wasatch Manor, Inc., operates the Wasatch Manor 
Apartments at 535 South 200 East, Salt Lake City, Utah. (R. 
60). Erickson's Complaint (which was amended by Order of 
the trial court dated May 16, 1989) alleged that on February 9, 
1985, while a resident of the Wasatch Manor Apartments, he 
slipped and fell on ice in the upper level of the Wasatch Manor 
parking lot. (R. 2, 214). Erickson brought this action to 
recover for injuries allegedly resulting from the February 9, 
1985 slip and fall. (R. 2-7, 214) 
According to Erickson's Complaint, the upper level of 
the Wasatch Manor parking lot is constructed in such a way that 
water from snow runs down the middle of the parking lot. 
(R. 3, 75, 214, 444 at p.12). It was alleged that on February 9 
1985, the upper terrace had been cleared of snow, and snow was 
piled in one area of the upper terrace. (R. 3, 214). Erickson 
further alleged that on February 9, 1985, the snow pile melted, 
the water ran down the middle of the parking lot, and froze 
during the night. (R. 3-4, 214). Further, the Complaint allege 
that around 11:15 p.m., Erickson fell on this ice which 
traversed the length of the parking lot, and that due to poor 
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lighting, Erickson did not see the ice before he fell. (R. 4, 
444 at p.12). 
Wasatch Manor and Salt Lake County had entered into a 
contract, whereby Salt Lake County paid Wasatch Manor for the 
privilege of its employees to park in the Wasatch Manor 
Apartments1 parking lot. (R. 61). Four County employees claimed 
to have fallen on ice or snow in the parking lot. (R. 61-64, 
438, 439, 441). Deposition testimony revealed the following 
information regarding the alleged falls of these four witnesses. 
Colleen Mark, an employee of the Salt Lake County 
Treasurer's Office, claimed that she fell in November of 1984 on 
ice in the Wasatch Manor Apartments' parking lot. (R. 439 at p. 
6). Ms. Mark claimed that on this occasion she was just getting 
ready to go to work. (Id. at p. 10.) She parked on the east 
side of the parking lot and was about an inch away from her car 
when she fell. (Id. at pp. 6-7.) Ms. Mark did not report 
her fall to Wasatch Manor, but reported it to her supervisor at 
the County Treasurer's office. (Id. at 11.) 
Wanda Jo Christensen, an employee of Salt Lake 
County Assessor's office, claimed to have fallen twice at the 
Wasatch Manor parking lot. Her first fall allegedly occurred 
sometime between 1968 and 1971. (R. 438 at p. 5). 
Ms. Christensen alleged that she fell while walking down a ramp, 
at a time when there was both ice and snow on the ground. (Id. 
at 6.) Ms. Christensen did not report this fall to Wasatch 
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Manor. (Id. at 7.) The second fall allegedly occurred between 
1984 and 1985. (Id. at p. 5.) Ms. Christensen had parked in a 
spot alongside of the building, and fell right near the door that 
goes into the Wasatch Manor Apartments. Ms. Christensen did not 
report her fall to Wasatch Manor, but asked the manager if she 
could walk through the lobby instead of walking down the ramp. 
(Id. at 11.) 
Rebecca Helms testified at her deposition that she 
parked on the west side of the upper-level parking lot along the 
building. (R. 441 at p. 8). Ms. Helms claims to have fallen 
several times. Her first fall occurred about thirteen years 
ago. (Id.). At that time, she was parked on the immediately 
next available space on the east side of the row of parking 
spaces alongside the building. Ms. Helms allegedly fell on ice 
by the side of her car in the morning as she was going to work. 
Ms. Helms did not report the fall to Wasatch Manor. (Id. at 17, 
18.) Ms. Helms' second fall probably occurred within the eight 
years prior to her October 1987 deposition. (Id. at 8.) This 
fall allegedly occurred around 8:00 a.m., farther north on the 
parking lot as Ms. Helms was going down the ramp. (Id. at 
14.) The snow had not been removed, but the ice was visible. 
(Id. at 15.) Ms. Helms did not report it to Wasatch Manor, but 
believes she spoke to a person who loaded the garbage regarding 
the treatment of ice. (:rd. at 16, 17.) Ms. Helms1 most recent 
fall allegedly occurred in November or December of 1986. (Id. 
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at 8.) On this particular occasion, Ms. Helms parked on the west 
side of the parking lot along the building, and she was right 
behind her car when she fell. (Id. at 8, 10.) This fall also 
occurred around 8:00 a.m., while there was both snow and ice in 
the parking lot. It was not reported to Wasatch Manor. (Id. 
at 11, 13.) 
Carol Back claimed that in the late 1970's, she fell 
by the ramp. She had parked along the east side of the parking 
lot, and walked towards the ramp, and was quite a distance from 
her car when she fell. (R. 63-64, 444 at pp.708). Ms. Back 
could see the ice in the parking lot before she fell. (R. 
63-64). Ms. Back failed to report the fall to Wasatch Manor. 
(Id.) 
Based upon the deposition testimony of the four 
witnesses, Wasatch moved the trial court for an Order in Limine 
excluding the testimony on the grounds that the prior and 
subsequent falls did not occur under circumstances substantially 
similar to Erickson's fall, and therefore were not relevant and 
or probative of Erickson's theories. (R. 58-59). In its 
Memorandum in Support of the Motion and at the hearing on the 
Motion, Wasatch pointed out that the depositions of the four 
County employees revealed that these witnesses could not pinpoint 
the dates of their alleged falls, that these falls were remote in 
time and some of them may have occurred more than thirteen years 
prior to the depositions, that the falls occurred in areas of the 
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parking lot other than the depressed area where Erickson 
allegedly fell, and that none of the witnesses reported any of 
their falls to Wasatch Manor personnel. (R. 60-71). 
The Court ruled that such testimony would not be 
admitted absent a showing that the design or construction of the 
parking structure was defective. The Court's Ruling stated: 
As far as the last issue is concerned, I 
have not made a study of the slip and fall 
cases as far as these prior accidents are 
concerned. I know I have had some 
experience as far as an automobile accident 
where there is a particular location in the 
highway of where a number of accidents have 
taken place. And I have not reviewed that 
either prior to taking the bench on this, 
but I do remember some of the things they 
say. And one of this is notice. 
I do know that whether notice was given 
to the city, the highway department, and so 
forth as far as a dangerous condition is 
concerned, another thing they look at is 
the time element, whether it was one 
month, six months, five years, ten years 
and so forth. And of course the main 
thing is whether the condition was the 
same, the road signs were the same, the 
designation of the road, the line down the 
center of the road, and so forth, and 
things of this sort. 
Well, this gets very difficult when you 
start talking about falls of 13, 15, 18 
years ago. And I am ^oing to rule this 
way: That if the plaintiff has evidence 
to show that there is, and he claims there 
is a dangerous condition which exists in 
that parking lot, engineering, 
construction where it was negligently 
constructed, where they made something that 
was negligent or defective and that people 
have fallen as a result of that, then I 
would allow prior falls. 
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If these prior falls are not in that same 
location as far as the depressed area of 
which he alleges is defective, such as 
going down the ramp or such as the other 
part of it, I just can't allow it. They 
are just not relevant as far as the 
situation is concerned. They may have 
fallen, and even some of them may have been 
five or ten years ago. 
But if he can tie it in to a defective 
condition in construction, something of a 
negligent nature, then I will allow it 
within the same area. And it sounds like 
to me there is only one that does this, and 
that's the one on the west side of where 
somebody walked out in back of their car 
and fell. 
* * * * * * * 
And I won't even allow that unless it can 
be shown that there was a defect as far as 
the construction which caused ice to form 
and people have been falling there. Of 
course that's even weak because still they 
didn't give notice to the principle, 
Wasatch Manor. 
. . . . So I hope you understand my 
ruling. I am saying that I will not allow 
the prior falls unless it can be 
established that there was a defective 
condition there and they were falling as a 
result of that defective engineered 
condition. 
(Emphasis added R. 443, attached as Appendix A). 
On the last day of trial, even though Erickson had 
not introduced any testimony, expert or otherwise, regarding the 
design or construction of the parking structure, Erickson's 
counsel moved the Court to reconsider its prior Order based upon 
the affidavits of two witnesses. (R. 184-194). The Affidavit of 
Rebecca Helms stated that she fell into the depressed area of the 
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parking lot during the month of January 1985 or February of 
1985. (R. 188). This statement was in contradiction to her 
deposition testimony that the most recent fall she had at the 
Wasatch Manor parking lot was in November or December of 1986, 
and the fall prior to that was sometime in the eight years prior 
to her deposition which was taken in October of 1987. (R. 441 at 
p. 8). Furthermore, Ms. Helms' deposition testimony made no 
mention of falling into the depressed area of the parking lot. 
(R. 441 at pp. 8-15). The Helms Affidavit also stated that 
within days of the supposed fall in January or February of 1985, 
she notified a man who worked for Wasatch and who was loading 
garbage at the time that the parking lot was icy and that she had 
fallen. (R. 188). This statement is again in contradiction to 
Helms' deposition testimony that she did not report the November 
or December 1986 fall to Wasatch personnel. (R. 441 at p. 11, 
13). Ms. Helms' testified at her deposition that she had fallen 
three times on the Wasatch parking lot, but the only fall 
regarding which she spoke to the Wasatch employee who was loading 
garbage was the fall that occurred within the eight years prior 
to the taking of her deposition in October of 1987. (R. 441 at 
pp. 8, 16-17). 
Similarly, the Affidavit of Jody Christensen stated 
that during the last two weeks of December 1984 or during the 
month of January 1985 she had fallen in the location marked with 
a dotted line on a diagram attached to the Affidavit. (R. 192, 
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the Affidavit of Jody Christensen is attached as Appendix B.) 
The diagram seems to indicate that the fall occurred in the same 
depressed area in which Erickson allegedly fell. (R. 194, 
Appendix B). This statement is in contradiction to Ms. 
Christensen's deposition wherein she testified that she could 
not recall whether the fall occurred in 1984 or 1985, let alone 
recall the month in which the fall occurred. (R. 438 at pp. 5, 
15). In addition, in her deposition, Ms. Christensen repeatedly 
testified that she could not recall specifically where the fall 
occurred, but remembered only that it occurred near the door to 
the Wasatch Manor Apartments close to the cars parked alongside 
the west row of parking spaces. (R. 438 at pp. 8-10, 15-16). 
Christensen1s Affidavit further stated that within a few days 
of her fall in December of 1984 or January of 1985, she told the 
manager of the Wasatch Manor Apartments that she had fallen and 
that the parking lot was unreasonably icy. (R. 192). However, 
at the time of her deposition, Christensen testified that she did 
not report the fall to anyone at Wasatach Manor. She only 
asked the manager if she could walk through the lobby instead of 
walking down the ramp. (R. 438, at p. 11). 
The court thereafter held a hearing in the absence of 
the jury on Erickson1s Motion to Reconsider. Nelson Hayes, 
counsel for Wasatch, vigorously objected to the admission of the 
testimony, arguing that the affidavits were in contradiction to 
the prior depositions, and that the admission of the testimony at 
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that point would be surprise to Wasatch who had relied on the 
court's prior Order and was not adequately prepared to 
cross-examine the surprise witnesses and to properly prepare 
Wasatch's defense. (R. 446 at pp. 52-56). In spite of 
Wasatch's objections and in spite of the court's prior Order 
which specifically excluded testimony regarding other falls 
unless it could be shown that the parking lot was defectively 
constructed and that the falls occurred around the same time 
and in the same area as where Mr. Erickson allegedly fell, 
the court admitted the testimony into evidence. The court stated: 
I could stop it if it was not within the 
relative time. But it appears that this is 
within that time limit. So that is just 
admissible testimony, regardless. And so I 
can't do anything about it. As far as the 
falls are concerned, that the falls, if they 
can be related to the time and similar 
situations, then that is also admissible. 
And if these falls took place, and based on 
what the testimony has been of the two 
principles of Wasatch Manor, if these falls 
have been during the '84-'85 season, and 
they were slipped on ice, the Court would 
allow testimony as far as falls. (Id. at 
pp. 55-56). 
Erickson's counsel then called witnesses Rebecca 
Helms, Jody Christensen and Colleen Mark, each of whom 
testified regarding their falls on the Wasatch Manor parking 
lot. At trial Ms. Helms and Ms. Christensen both pinpointed 
their falls as having occurred in the same month or the month 
prior to Erickson's fall. (R. 446 at pp. 64, 87). They 
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further testified that they had in fact reported their falls to 
Wasatch Manor. Id. at pp. 62-63, 89). They even went so far 
as to identify Art Kersey in the court room as the Wasatch 
Manor employee with whom they spoke. (Id.) 
Wasatch's counsel thereafter presented the defense of 
Wasatch through the testimony of Burton Miller, the manager of 
the Wasatch Manor Apartments, and Art Kersey, the engineer 
employed by Wasatch Manor Apartments. (R. 446 at pp. 
121-140). Wasatch's counsel did not call any witnesses to 
rebut the testimony of Rebecca Helms, Jody Christensen and 
Colleen Mark. 
At the trial of this matter, against the objections of 
Wasatch's counsel, the Court gave Jury Instruction No. 20, 
which states in pertinent part: 
The defendant has a duty to exercise 
ordinary care to maintain the common 
walkways in reasonably safe condition for 
tenants and guests. The defendant has a 
further duty to observe any dangerous 
condition known to him or which by the use 
of reasonable diligence would have become 
known to him and to take reasonable steps 
to remedy or remove any such dangerous 
condition. 
(Emphasis added, R. 223-256, Jury Instruction No. 20 has been 
reproduced in its entirety and attached as Appendix C.) 
On May 19, 1989, the jury returned a verdict finding 
Wasatch Manor, Inc. negligent. The jury awarded a total 
verdict of $84,820.15 to Erickson. (R. 446 at pp. 201-205). 
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On June 13, 1989, Judgment was entered on the verdict. (R. 
280-281, attached as Appendix D). 
On June 23, 1989, Wasatch filed a timely Motion for 
a New Trial on the grounds that the admission of the testimony 
of Christensen, Helms, and Mark on the last day of trial 
constituted surprise which prejudiced Wasatch's defense, and 
also on the grounds that Jury Instruction No. 20 incorrectly 
stated the standard of care required of a landlord. (R. 
373-386). Wasatch presented its position and arguments to the 
court by filing a Memorandum of Points and Authorities and 
thereafter filing a Reply Memorandum in response to 
Erickson's memorandum objecting to the Motion. (R. 373-384, 
409-414). On August 7, 1989, Judge Wilkinson issued a 
Minute Entry denying Wasatch's Motion for a New Trial. (R. 
419, attached is Appendix E). The Minute Entry does not state 
the reasons for the court's denial of Wasatch's Motion. 
(Id.). An Order to the same effect was entered on September 
19, 1989. (R. 420-421). 
Wasatch hereby appeals from the judgment entered 
against it on June 13, 1989, and from the court's Order dated 
September 19, 1989, denying Wasatch's Motion for a New Trial. 
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SUMMARY OF AGREEMENT 
Wasatch appeals from the Judgment entered on 
September 19, 1989 on the grounds that (1) the testimony of 
Rebecca Helms, Jody Christensen and Colleen Mark was 
improperly admitted, and (2) that the Court improperly 
instructed the jury as to the standard of care required of a 
landlord. The trial court erred in admitting testimony which 
it had expressly excluded by its prior Order in Limine, The 
admission of such evidence was an abuse of discretion, because 
were it not for the improper admission, the jury would not 
have returned the verdict that it did against Wasatch. 
First, the original Order of the trial court excluding the 
testimony was the correct ruling in light of the law regarding 
the admissibility of prior and subsequent accidents. 
Secondly, the admission of such testimony in total 
contradiction to the prior Order was a complete surprise to 
appellant Wasatch, whose counsel had prepared Wasatch's 
defense with reliance upon the court's prior Order. 
Furthermore, because the trial court had the change of heart 
on the very last day of trial, at the very end of Erickson's 
presentation of his case, Wasatch was unable to produce 
rebuttal witnesses to contradict the surprise testimony. 
The Court improperly instructed the jury that the 
defendant has a duty to exercise ordinary care to maintain the 
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common walkways in a reasonably safe condition, and had a 
further duty to observe any dangerous condition known to him 
and take reasonable steps to remedy the condition. This 
instruction essentially created a strict liability type of 
standard for Wasatch, because it imposed an additional duty 
beyond ordinary reasonable care under the circumstances, and 
that was the duty to observe specific conditions and remove 
them. This is an erroneous instruction under Utah 
landlord/tenant law and it prejudiced Wasatch. 
Finally, Wasatch appeals from the trial court's 
order denying its motion for a new trial. Wasatch argued to 
the court by memorandums of law that it had met all the 
elements of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 59(a)(3), and 
that it was entitled to a new trial on the grounds of 
surprise. Wasatch also argued to the court that Jury 
Instruction No. 2 0 was improper. The court, however, denied 
Wasatch's Motion without indicating its reasons therefore. 
Wasatch was clearly entitled to a new trial. The denial of 
the Motion was an abuse of discretion. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING TESTIMONY 
PREVIOUSLY EXCLUDED BY THE COURT'S ORDER IN LIMINE. 
The proper standard of review on appeal for a trial 
court's admission of evidence is abuse of discretion. Rule 
L03(a) of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides that, "Error may 
lot be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence 
mless a substantial right of the party is affected." Thus, a 
brial court's determination of admissibility can be reversed when 
It is shown that the trial court abused its discretion, and that 
bhat abuse of discretion affected a party's substantial rights. 
Sardy v. Hardy, 776 P.2d 917, 924-925 (Utah App. 1989); 
State v. Jamison, 767 P.2d 134, 137 (Utah App. 1989). In 
determining whether a substantial right of the party is affected, 
an appellate court must decide whether there is a reasonable 
Likelihood that a different result would have been reached absent 
bhe error. State v. Northrup, 756 P.2d 1288, 1285 (Utah 
\pp. 1988); Belden v. Dalbo, Inc., 752 P.2d 1317, 1319 
(Utah App. 1988); State v. Speer# 750 P.2d 186, 189 (Utah 
L988). 
-17-
A. The Original Order in Limine Excluding the Prior and 
Subsequent Slip and Falls Was a Correct Ruling of Lav. 
The admissibility of prior accidents is totally within 
the discretion of the trial judge. American Broadcasting 
Companies, Inc. v. Kenai Air of Hawaii, Inc., 686 P.2d 1, 5 
(Hawaii 1984); Burgbacher v. Mellor, 112 Ariz. 481, 543 
P.2d 1110, 1112 (1975). However, the general rule is that 
evidence of prior similar incidents may be admissible when 
offered for a valid purpose, when relevant to a material issue, 
and when its probative value outweighs any prejudice resulting 
from its admission. Jacobs v. Commonwealth Highland Theaters, 
Inc., 738 P.2d 6, 9 (Colo. App. 1986). A valid purpose 
includes attempts to prove a defective or dangerous condition and 
to establish notice. Before evidence of prior incidents may be 
admitted, it must be shown that the conditions under which the 
previous accidents occurred were the same or substantially 
similar to the one in question. Kaeo v. Davis, 719 P.2d 387, 
393 (Hawaii 1986); Burgbacher v. Mellor, 543 P.2d at 1112; 
State v. Stewart, 12 Utah 2d 273, 365 P.2d 785, 786 (1961). 
The same is true in determining the admissibility of subsequent 
accidents. Johnson v. State, 636 P.2d 47 (Alaska 1981); 
Thursby v. Reynolds Metals Co., 466 So.2d 245 (Fla. App. 
1984) . 
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Evidence that would merely prove that many accidents 
had occurred at a particular place, or that such location was an 
accident-prone location is properly excludable. State v. 
Stewart, 36 P.2d at 786. There must be a showing of substantial 
similarity of conditions. Furthermore, even accidents which are 
proven to have occurred under substantially similar 
circumstances may be excluded if the danger of unfair surprise, 
prejudice, confusion of the issues or the consideration of undue 
consumption of time is disproportionate to the probative value 
of the evidence. Kaeo v. Davis, 719 P.2d at 393. The 
following factors are important in determining whether sufficient 
similarity of circumstances exists in order to make the prior 
or subsequent accidents admissible: The nature of the accidents, 
their location, the time of day, the quality of lighting, the 
condition of the premises, and the time difference between the 
prior accidents and the accident in question. Jacobs, 738 
P.2d at 10. 
Due to substantial differences between Erickson's 
fall and the alleged slip and falls of the witnesses, the prior 
and subsequent accidents lacked probative value and should not 
have been admitted into evidence. The witnesses1 deposition 
testimony indicated that their slip and falls occurred in 
locations different from the location where Erickson fell. 
Erickson claimed that he fell on ice collected in a "depressed 
area" of the parking lot which runs in a north and southerly 
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direction immediately east of the first row of parking spaces 
along the west side of the parking lot. Ms. Mark testified that 
her fall occurred on the far east side of the parking lot. 
Ms. Christensen allegedly fell once while walking down a ramp, 
and a second time on the far west side of the parking lot. 
According to Ms. Helms, she first fell about thirteen years ago 
on the east w of parking spaces, which would be east of the 
"depressed area." Ms. Helms' second fall occurred on the north 
side of the parking lot as she was going down a ramp. Ms. Helms 
claimed to have fallen a third time after she parked on the far 
west side of the parking lot and walked behind her car towards 
the north end of the lot. Ms. Back's fall occurred by the ramp. 
Thus, the only fall that might have occurred near the 
location of Erickson's fall was Ms. Helm's fall as she was 
walking behind her car. However, none of the witnesses, 
including Ms. Helms, testified at their depositions that they 
fell in a "depressed area." None of the witnesses could specify 
a specific day or even month and only generally a time of day. 
Therefore, these other slip and falls were not probative of 
Erickson's theory that the condition of the parking lot created 
a hazardous depressed area where ice accumulated. 
Secondly, the prior and subsequent accidents occurred 
at a different time of day than Erickson's fall. Erickson 
testified that he fell at 11:15 p.m. and that due to poor 
lighting, he did not see the ice upon which he fell. However, 
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depositions of the witnesses indicated that they all fell during 
daylight, around 8 a.m. Furthermore, they had all testified 
their depositions that they saw the ice before they fell. The 
conditions of the parking lot may vary greatly between 8:00 a.m. 
and 11:15 p.m. Furthermore, since the witnesses saw the ice upon 
which they fell, this testimony was not helpful to prove 
plaintiff's theory that ice accumulated in a depressed area and 
that he didn't see the ice. 
The condition of the premises is another substantial 
difference between Erickson's fall and the prior and subsequent 
accidents. In the case of Evans v. Park, 112 Idaho 400, 732 
P.2d 369 (Idaho App. 1987), plaintiff was a social guest who 
suffered injury when he slipped and fell on ice covering the 
front steps of defendants' residence. At trial, plaintiff 
attempted to introduce testimony of a woman who allegedly 
slipped, but did not fall on the same steps approximately one 
month prior to Evans' accident. 732 P.2d at 371. The court held 
that the testimony was inadmissible. The court reasoned that 
changing weather, as well as intervening foot traffic on the 
steps, would have altered their condition so greatly that any 
evidence of that condition one month before the accident would 
lack probative value. 
Weather conditions may vary greatly from year to year, 
month to month, even day to day. In this case, the witnesses 
claimed that their slip and falls occurred as far as thirteen 
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years prior to the slip and fall in question. During that time, 
conditions in the parking lot would have changed dramatically due 
to changing weather, a change in the amount of snowfall, change 
in the procedures for removal of snow and icing of the parking 
lot, and differing amounts of vehicle or foot traffic in the 
parking lot. According to the Evans v. Park analysis, these 
alleged accidents lacked probative value and should not have been 
admitted into evidence. 
Finally, the prior and subsequent accidents should not 
have been admitted into evidence because they lacked a proper 
foundation. In Burgbacher v. Mellor, plaintiff's decedent 
died as a result of brain injuries suffered when he slipped and 
fell while hurrying across a wet exterior sidewalk near the north 
entrance of a medical building. At trial, the deposition 
testimony of a former maintenance man was read to the jury. The 
testimony was to the effect that one day the witnesses' wife 
almost slipped on the wet sidewalk. The court held that this 
testimony should not have been admitted into evidence, as proper 
foundation had not been established. "The fact that the woman 
almost slipped was put before the jury but when she slipped was 
not clear and therefore, a proper foundation for the evidence was 
not laid." 543 P.2d at 1112, emphasis added. 
The witnesses in this case could not pinpoint, at the 
time of their depositions, when their falls occurred. 
Therefore, Burchbacher dictates that the prior and subsequent 
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accidents were inadmissible because they lacked proper 
foundation. The trial court properly ruled such testimony 
inadmissible unless and until Erickson made a showing that the 
parking lot was defectively constructed, and even so, only those 
falls that occurred within the same time period and within the 
same area of the parking lot as Erickson1s fall would be 
admitted. (R. 443, Appendix A). 
The court should not have reversed its prior Order in 
Limine upon Ericksonfs Motion to Reconsider. Ericksonfs 
Motion for reconsideration was based upon the affidavits of 
Jody Christensen and Rebecca Helms. As indicated under the 
Facts Statement of this brief, these affidavits were in 
contradiction to the prior deposition testimony of Ms. 
Christensen and Ms. Helms. It is well established that as a 
matter of general evidence law, a deposition is a more reliable 
means of ascertaining the truth than an affidavit. Guardian 
State Bank v. Humphreys, 762 P.2d 1084, 1087 (Utah 1988); 
Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170, 1172 (Utah 1983). This is 
because a deponent is subject to cross-examination while an 
affiant is not. Webster, 675 P.2d at 1172. Secondly, 
regardless of the existence of the affidavits, the court's Order 
in Limine had expressly stated that before the slip and falls 
would be admitted, Erickson had to show a defect in the design 
or construction of the parking lot. (R. 443, Appendix A). 
Erickson clearly failed to make such a showing during the 
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presentation of his case and even upon his Motion for 
Reconsideration of the Order in Limine. Because the conditions 
established by the court had not been met, the testimony of 
Jody Christensen, Rebecca Helms and Colleen Mark should not 
have been admitted. 
B. The Admission of the Testimony of Rebecca Helms, Jody 
Christensen^ and Colleen Mark on the Very Last Day of the 
Trial Constituted Surprise Which Ordinary Prudence Could Not 
Have Guarded Against, and it Greatly Prejudiced Wasatch's 
Defense. 
Assuming, arguendo, that the other falls were 
substantially similar to Erickson's fall, the trial court 
committed reversible error in admitting the testimony in 
contradiction to its prior Order when there was no opportunity 
for Wasatch to arrange for rebuttal testimony. The admission of 
such testimony constituted surprise which ordinary prudence could 
not have guarded against and prejudiced Wasatch's defense. 
Wasatch's counsel had properly conducted discovery and deposed 
witnesses Christensen, Helms, and Mark to obtain a complete 
understanding of the facts and to properly prepare and evaluate 
Wasatch's defense. Based upon these depositions, Wasatch 
brought a Motion in Limine to exclude the prior and subsequent 
falls. After successfully securing the court's Order in Limine, 
Wasatch's counsel relied upon the guidelines set forth in the 
court's Order in preparing for trial. However, nothing that 
Wasatch's counsel could do could have prepared it for the 
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sudden reversal of the Order in Limine which took place on the 
last day of trial. 
The court's admission of the testimony of Rebecca 
Helms, Jody Christensen, and Colleen Mark constituted a 
surprise for several reasons. First of all, Erickson's counsel 
intentionally waited until the last day of trial to notify 
Wasatch's counsel and the court that his witnesses had changed 
their testimony. Although in his opening statements, Mr. 
Bjorklund told the jury that he might call several witnesses 
that will talk about the parking lot, Bjorklund refused to 
reveal to the court and to Wasatch's counsel his theory for 
overcoming the court's Order in Limine. (R. 445 at p. 13). 
However, around 11:30 a.m. on the last day of trial, Mr. 
Bjorklund presented his Motion for Reconsideration of the Order 
in Limine along with the affidavits of Jody Christensen and 
Rebecca Helms. It was later learned at trial, upon 
cross-examination of Ms. Helms, that Mr. Bjorklund knew that 
Ms. Helms and Ms. Christensen would change their testimony almost 
three weeks before the trial. (R. 446 at p. 76). Thus, 
Wasatch's counsel was genuinely surprised that Ms. Helms and 
Ms. Christensen changed their deposition testimony. 
Secondly, the admission of this testimony constituted 
surprise to Wasatch because it had no way of preparing for the 
eventuality that the court might reverse its Order, particularly 
where the guidelines set forth in the Order had not been met. As 
-25-
stated previously, the court's oral Ruling on Wasatch's Motion 
in Limine clearly stated that before evidence of the prior slip 
and falls could be admitted, Erickson had to show that there 
was a defect in the construction or design of the Wasatch Manor 
parking lot. The ruling further stated that in the event that 
Erickson made such a showing, the court would admit into 
evidence only those falls that occurred within the same time 
period and the same area of the parking lot as Erickson's 
fall. (R. 443, attached as Appendix A). Erickson's Motion for 
Reconsideration and the attached affidavits were mere attempts to 
show that the prior falls of Christensen and Helms occurred at 
the same time period and the same area in the parking lot as 
Erickson's fall. At no time during the trial or upon 
Erickson's Motion for Reconsideration did he make a showing 
that the parking lot was defectively constructed. 
At the hearing held by the court on Erickson's Motion 
for Reconsideration, counsel for Wasatch, Nelson Hayes, objected 
to the admission of such evidence and argued that the admission 
of the testimony was a complete surprise. Mr. Hayes stated: 
Your Honor, our position basically is 
unchanged from when it was argued before 
your Honor on April 5, 1989. It's our 
position that these falls, and particularly 
as indicated in the affidavit is the 
reputation of the parking lot, is of no 
probative value. And he can't lay 
foundation that it had anything to do 
whatever in the fall Mr. Erickson had on a 
specific night and specific day. 
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As to the remainder of it having to do with 
some form of impeachment value, the only 
thing I can say is I would believe that it 
would at this point and time, for me, 
constitute surprise. And the reason it 
does, your Honor, is, I took the depositions 
of these women and in good faith, relied 
upon what they were telling me in 
preparation of this case and in evaluating 
the case and in doing what I had to do. 
Then, prior to trial, I brought a motion in 
limine to determine whether indeed they were 
going to be able to testify. 
The affidavit now states that their 
testimony has changed from their deposition 
testimony. Because they have had an 
opportunity now, within the last few days, 
to review with plaintiff's counsel the facts 
of the case. I haven't had—I won't have an 
opportunity until they get on the stand to 
understand or know the reasons for their 
decision to change their testimony. 
And in most circumstances, an affidavit 
offered to rebut one's prior deposition 
testimony is subject to a motion to strike 
anyway. And I can't adequately prepare by 
hearing, even at the beginning of the trial 
their names that he was still planning to 
call them and an explanation today that they 
have now changed their deposition testimony, 
to adequately prepare to cross-examine them 
and do what I need to do to defend my 
clients. 
So, I would strictly resist them testifying 
at this point in the trial. I can't fairly 
and dutifully as a lawyer agree to it 
without taking a strong resistance, based on 
my inability to prepare for some change that 
I am not aware of. 
I went through the process of taking 
depositions and trying to ascertain what the 
facts were. 
(R. 446 at pp. 51-53). 
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Wasatch was greatly prejudiced by the admission of the 
surprise testimony. Because Wasatch was faced with the changed 
testimony at the last minute, it was not prepared to 
cross-examine these witnesses and to arrange for rebuttal 
testimony. Wasatch was precluded from learning the reasons or 
the inducement for the witnesses' change in their testimony 
without doing so in front of the jury. It was precluded from 
knowing what their trial testimony would actually be. Wasatch 
did not know what questions to ask of these witnesses, because it 
did not know how the questions would be answered by the 
witnesses. Thus, Wasatch was required, essentially, to do a 
discovery deposition in front of the jury. Finally, Wasatch had 
no opportunity to seek other witnesses who could verify or 
legitimize the trial testimony of Christensen, Helms and Mark. 
Prior to trial, Wasatch had not prepared to call any such 
rebuttal witnesses. Certainly, it would have been a strategic 
mistake for Wasatch to call witnesses who would discuss the 
condition of the parking lot and testify regarding the lack of 
falls on the parking lot. To do so would have been to open the 
door for the testimony which Wasatch had expressly tried to 
exclude through its Motion for an Order in Limine. 
The admission of the surprise testimony had a material 
bearing on the case. This testimony brought into doubt the 
testimony of Wasatch's witnesses Burton Miller and Art Kersey, 
who had testified that the maintenance personnel of Wasatch Manor 
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had taken reasonable precautions to make the premises safe for 
the tenants and that they had no notice of any prior falls 
occurring on the premises. The testimony of Helms, Christensen 
and Mark indicated to the jury that the Wasatch's premises may 
not have been safe and that at least Mr. Kersey had notice of 
prior falls on the premises. Thus, the surprise testimony 
impeached the only witnesses called by Wasatch, and Wasatch had 
no opportunity to try and produce other witnesses to rebut the 
testimony of Helms, Christensen and Mark. 
The jury's decision was undoubtedly influenced by the 
surprise testimony, especially in light of the fact that in his 
closing statement Erickson's counsel emphasized that Wasatch 
had not introduced any testimony of disinterested witnesses. 
Did we hear from anybody in the defense camp 
about the condition of that parking lot all 
through that winter other than the manager and 
the man who is supposed to salt it? Did they 
bring anybody from their apartment to come here 
to their aid and say, hey, it was always 
salted. About did they bring anybody from the 
county. I don't think you can reach any other 
conclusion but that that place was always icy. 
(R. 446 at p. 154). 
The result of the trial would have been different had 
it not been for the admission of the testimony of Ms. Helms, Ms. 
Christensen, and Ms. Mark. A brief interview of two jurors after 
the trial indicated that the jury was greatly influenced by the 
testimony of these witnesses, and that without such testimony the 
jury would not have been able to enter a verdict of negligence on 
-29-
the part of Wasatch. The jurors interviewed could not understand 
why Wasatch had not called other disinterested tenants of Wasatch 
Manor to rebut the testimony of Helms, Christensen and Mark. 
Thus, there is certainly more than a reasonable 
likelihood that Wasatch would have obtained a different result if 
it had had an opportunity to prepare its defense with respect to 
the testimony regarding the alleged prior and subsequent 
falls. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR 
IN GIVING JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 20. 
In determining whether a trial court committed 
reversible error in giving a particular jury instruction, the 
Court of Appeals must determine whether in absence of the alleged 
error a more favorable result would have been obtained by 
Wasatch. Matter of Estate of Kesler, 702 P.2d 86, 96 (Utah 
1985); Harris v. Utah Transit Authority, 671 P.2d 217, 22 (Utah 
1983); Rowley v. Graven Brothers & Company, 26 Utah 2d 448, 
491 P.2d 1209, 1211 (1971). It is the position of Wasatch that 
Jury Instruction No. 20 was an incorrect statement of the law, it 
incorrectly instructed the jury as to the standard of care 
required of a landlord and misled the jury into applying a strict 
liability type of standard to Wasatch. Were it not for such 
improper application of the landlord/tenant law, a reasonable 
-30-
jury would likely find that Wasatch had not met its standard of 
care. 
It is well established in Utah that the duty owed by a 
landlord to his tenants and their guests is the duty to 
exercise ordinary care to maintain the common areas in a 
reasonably safe condition. Gregory v. Fourthwest Investments, 
Ltd., 754 P.2d 89, 91 (Utah App. 1988); Schofield v. 
Kinzell, 29 Utah 2d 427, 511 P.2d 149, 151 (1973). However, a 
landlord is not an insurer of the safety of his tenants, and 
merely because an injury results from a slip and fall upon ice 
does not automatically create liabilities. Gregory, 745 P.2d 
at 91. 
At trial, against the objections of Wasatch's 
counsel, the Court gave Jury Instruction No. 20, which states in 
pertinent part: 
The defendant has a duty to exercise 
ordinary care to maintain the common 
walkways in reasonably safe condition for 
tenants and guests. The defendant has a 
further duty to observe any dangerous 
condition known to him or which by the use 
of reasonable diligence would have become 
known to him and to take reasonable steps 
to remedy or remove any such dangerous 
condition. 
(Emphasis added, R. 223-256, Appendix C.) The first sentence 
of the above quoted paragraph in Instruction No. 20 correctly 
states the standard of care to be applied to a landlord. 
However, the second sentence of the instruction imposes a 
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higher duty of care on the landlord, akin to strict 
liability. It imposes an additional "further" duty on the 
landlord beyond the duty of ordinary care, and that is a duty 
to observe dangerous conditions and to take reasonable steps 
to remedy or remove the dangerous condition. 
It is clear, in light of Gregory v. Fourthwest 
and Schofield v. Kinzell that no such extra duty may be 
imposed upon a landlord, because a landlord is not a guarantor 
of the safety of his tenants. 
The mere accumulation of snow or ice does not 
ipso facto make the landlord liable, he must be 
given a reasonable time after the storm has 
ceased to remove the accumulations or to take 
such measures as will make the common areas 
reasonably safe for those conditions which pose 
an unreasonable risk of harm to the user. 
Schofield, 511 P.2d at 151. Therefore, in order to recover, 
the plaintiff must demonstrate that defendant knew, or in the 
exercise of ordinary care should have known, that a dangerous 
condition existed and that sufficient time had elapsed to take 
corrective action. Gregory, 745 P. 2d at 91, citing Martin 
v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 565 P.2d 1139, 1140-41 (Utah 1977); 
Schofield, 511 P.2d at 161. 
In the case of Martin v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 
supra, the Utah Supreme Court upheld the trial court's directed 
verdict for the defendant. In that case, the plaintiff fell on a 
sidewalk leading from the parking lot of a grocery store to the 
main entrance of the store. The evidence, taken in the light 
-32-
most favorable to the plaintiff, indicated that she fell at a 
place in the sidewalk where there was a slight flaking of the 
concrete, and where ice had accumulated. 565 P.2d at 1140. The 
court found the plaintiff had failed to produce any evidence to 
show that the defendant knew of the dangerous condition and had 
time to correct it. The court held that it was not the duty of 
persons in control of buildings to mop the sidewalk dry or to 
take other steps necessary to prevent accumulation of moisture on 
the sidewalk that might freeze and create an icy condition. The 
landowner, said the court, has no duty to seek out and mop dry 
all depressions in the walkways and approaches to its buildings. 
Id. at 1141. 
Therefore, Jury Instruction No. 20 was improperly given 
to the jury. This instruction misled the jury into applying a 
higher standard of care to Wasatch rather than ordinary care 
under the circumstances. Absent this instruction, a reasonable 
jury would likely have found that Wasatch met its standard of 
care. The evidence presented at trial indicates that Wasatch 
Manor fully performed its duty to Erickson. Wasatch Manor had 
contracted with an independent contractor for the removal of snow 
from the parking lot. (R. 446 at p. 26) In addition, Wasatch 
Manor employees salted and/or de-iced the parking lot and 
walkways three times a day. (Id. at pp. 37-40) If Wasatch 
employees found ice covering the entire parking lot, they used a 
fertilizer spreader to spread the salt or de-icer over the 
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entire lot. However, if ice was found in spots, Wasatch's 
employees used a bucket and spread salt or de-icer by hand. 
(Id. at pp. 38-40). This procedure was a daily routine. 
(Id. at pp. 34-35, 37-40). This procedure was followed on 
February 9, 1985, the day that Erickson claims to have fallen. 
(Id. at pp. 34-37). 
These snow and ice removal procedures were more than 
reasonable under the circumstances. Instruction No. 20 imposed 
upon Wasatch an additional obligation that was expressly rejected 
by the Utah supreme Court in Martin v. Safeway Stores. 
It is not the duty of persons in control of such 
buildings to mop the sidewalk dry or to take 
other steps necessary to prevent the accumulation 
of moisture on the sidewalk that might freeze and 
create an icy condition . . . and it cannot be 
the duty of persons in control of such buildings 
to seek out and mop dry all such depressions in 
the walkways and approaches to such building. 
Id. The court improperly instructed the jury as to a landlord's 
standard of care to his tenants. This instruction was erroneous 
and was prejudicial to Wasatch. (See Cornwell v. Barton, 
18 Utah 2d 325, 442 P.2d 663 (1967) (case remanded for a new 
trial because trial court committed prejudicial error in giving a 
jury instruction which misstated the standard of care required of 
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a landlord.) 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 
FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
The proper standard of review on appeal for a denial of 
a motion for new trial is abuse of discretion. Moon Lake 
Electric v. Ultra Systems Western Constructors, Inc., 767 P.2d 
125, 128 (Utah App. 1988); Chournos v. D'Agnillo, 642 
P.2d 710, 713 (Utah 1982). The trial court's ruling regarding a 
motion for a new trial can be overturned if there is a showing 
that the trial court's action was arbitrary, or that it clearly 
transgressed any reasonable bounds of discretion. Lembach v. 
Cox, 639 P.2d 197, 201 (Utah 1981); Hyland v. St. Mark's 
Hospital, 19 Utah 2d 134, 427 P.2d 736, 738 (1967). In the 
present case, the trial court acted arbitrarily and abused its 
discretion in denying Wasatch's Motion for a new trial. 
Wasatch's Motion was based on the grounds that it was 
entitled to a new trial due (1) to the admission of surprise 
testimony regarding prior and subsequent falls on Wasatch's 
premises, and (2) because the trial court improperly gave Jury 
Instruction No. 20. Rule 59(a)(3) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure provides that a new trial may be granted to any party 
on the basis of surprise which ordinary prudence could not have 
guarded against. See also Anderson v. Bradley, 590 P.2d 
339, 341 (Utah 1979). The trial court has broad discretion in 
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granting or denying a motion for a new trial. Donohue v. 
Intermountain Health Care, 748 P.2d 1067, 1068 (Utah 1987). 
The factors required for a new trial based on surprise are: 
(1) actual surprise, (2) the facts had a 
material bearing on the case, (3) the 
Court's decision mainly rested on these 
facts (4) the surprise did not result from 
the moving party's inattentiveness or 
negligence, (5) the motion for new trial 
was promptly filed, (6) the moving party 
acted reasonably at the time of the 
surprise, and (7) the result of a new trial 
would probably be different. 
In re Adoption of S.E., 755 P.2d 27, 31 (Mont. 1988). 
In Wasatch's Memorandum in Support of its Motion for 
a New Trial, Wasatch argued that all the factors required for the 
granting of a new trial on the grounds of surprise were met, as 
more particularly briefed in Point I.B. of this Argument 
(R. 373-384). In addition, Wasatch argued in its Memorandum to 
the court that Jury Instruction No. 20 was improperly given on 
the grounds more particularly briefed in Point II of this 
Argument. (Id.). However, the trial court denied Wasatch's 
Motion on both grounds. The court's Minute Entry stated only 
that the court had reviewed the file, read the pleadings and 
decided to deny the motion. (R. 419). Under the circumstances 
of this case, and as briefed in detail in the above two 
arguments, Wasatch was entitled to a new trail. The court's 
failure to grant Wasatch's Motion, particularly without 
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providing reasons therefore, was arbitrary and an abuse of 
discretion. 
Erickson will undoubtedly argue, as he did in his 
Memorandum in Response to Wasatch's Motion for a New Trial, 
that Wasatch does not have a right to a new trial because it 
failed to object to the admission of evidence at the time the 
evidence was offered at trial. However, as Wasatch's Reply 
Memorandum argued to the trial court, counsel for Wasatch had 
sufficiently objected to the admission of the testimony of Ms. 
Helms, Ms. Christensen and Ms. Mark by: (1) filing and arguing a 
Motion in Limine regarding the admissibility of such testimony 
before the same judge as the one who presided over the trial, and 
(2) by objecting and stating its position as to the admissibility 
of such testimony on the last day of trial during the hearing 
held on Erickson's Motion to Reconsider. (R. 60-71, 409-414, 
444, 446 at pp. 51-56). In State v. Johnson, 748 P.2d 1069, 
1071-1072 (Utah 1987), the Supreme Court of Utah held that where 
a party has prior to trial moved to exclude evidence, he does not 
need to object at trial or renew his pretrial motion in order to 
preserve the issue at trial, if the trial judge is also the judge 
who ruled on the pretrial motion and the record indicates that an 
evidentiary hearing was held. 
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CONCLUSION 
Appellant Wasatch seeks reversal of the Judgment 
entered against it and Judgment in its favor as a matter of 
law, or that failing, a new trial. The trial court should not 
have admitted testimony which was previously excluded by the 
court's Order in Limine. Wasatch had a right to rely upon the 
guidelines set forth in that Order and to prepare its case for 
trial accordingly. The admission of this testimony at the last 
minute greatly prejudiced Wasatch's defense. 
Secondly, Instruction Number No. 20 incorrectly stated 
the standard of care required of a landlord, and essentially 
created a strict liability type of standard that the jury applied 
to Wasatch. Such an erroneous instruction is not supported by 
Utah law. 
Finally, the trial court erred in denying Wasatch's 
Motion for a New Trial. Wasatch was entitled to a new trial due 
to the improper admission of the surprise testimony and due to 
the improper jury instruction. Therefore, the trial court's 
Judgment should be reversed. In the alternative, this Court 
should remand this case for a new trial. 
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Respectfully submitted this 19th day of April, 1990. 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 
& NELSON 
Nelsdn L. Hayes /) 
Masuda A. Medcalf u 
Attorneys for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that four (4) 
of the foregoing instrument were mailed, 
prepaid on this 19th day of April, 1990, to the following 
counsel of record: 
true and correct copies 
first-class, postage 
Eric Bjorklund 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
3808 South West Temple, Suite ID 
Salt Lake City, Uta 84111 
W/,/) , 
ERICKS2/MAM 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
* * * 
¥foiA4U 
Plaintiff, 
v 
WASATCH MANOR, INC., et al., 
Defendants. 
Civil No. C86-845 
Transcript of: 
BENCH RULING ON 
MOTIONS IN LIMINE 
* * * 
BEFORE THE HONORABLE HOMER F. WILKINSON, JUDGE 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Wednesday, April 5, 1989 
APPEARANCES 
For the Plintiff: 
For the Defendant 
ERIC W. BJORKLUND 
Attorney at Law 
136 East So. Temple, #1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
NELSON L. HAYES 
Attorney at Law 
50 South Main Street, #700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
REPORTER: SUZANNE WARNICK, RPR, CSR 
Official Court Reporter 
240 East 400 South, #A-534 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
801-535-5479 
1**^6*1 Ss?\r* 
WEDNESDAY, APRIL 5, 1989; 3:00 P.M. 
BENCH RULING ON MOTIONS IN LIMINE 
THE COURT: Well, let me rule then. 
MR. BJORKLUND: Your Honor, could I have a 
brief other word. 
THE COURT: No. It's his motion. And I think 
8 I you have covered your two motions, and he has the last 
9 say. Otherwise I'll have to let him say again. 
10 I do grant the motion to amend the 
11 Complaint. 
12 As far as the plaintiff's motion for the 
13 report of the expert, as the Court looks at the rule of 
14 which has been brought up, when the defense does obtain 
15 an expert in a field and obtains a report from him that 
16 is going to be used for the case trial, that that 
17 report, itself, when he has used that for his trial 
18 preparation is not discoverable, although the witness 
19 may be deposed. I know in a lot of cases that it is 
20 given, and it saves a lot of expense and I guess time as 
21 far as counsel is concerned. 
2 2
 I I would indicate this: That if it's sure 
that he is going to be used in his case in principle and 23 
24 the plaintiff is definitely bringing in an engineer to 
25 set forth his position, then I am going to allow or I am 
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16 
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23 
24 
25 
going to be ordering that it be produced. And I really 
feel I am extending it there, except because of the fact 
that you would just end up taking a deposition. But if 
it's going to be a rebuttal situation, I am not going to 
order it be produced. I would order that you be allowed 
to depose him if you wish to do so. I donft think there 
is any question on that. 
As far as the last issue is concerned, I 
have not made a study of the slip and fall cases as far 
as these prior accidents are concerned. I know I have 
had some experience as far as an automobile accident 
where there is a particular location in the highway of 
where a number of accidents have taken place. And I 
have not reviewed that either prior to taking the bench 
on this, but I do remember some of the things they say. 
And one of them is notice. 
I do know that whether notice was given to 
the city, the highway department, and so forth as far as 
a dangerous condition is concerned, another thing they 
look at is the time element, whether it was one month, 
six months, five years, ten years and so forth. And of 
course the main thing is whether the condition was the 
same, the road signs were the same, the designation of 
the road, the line down the center of the road, and so 
forth, and things of this sort. 
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Well, this gets very difficult when you start 
talking about falls of 13, 15, 18 years ago. And I am 
going to 
evidence 
dangerous 
engineer! 
rule this way: That if the plaintiff has 
to show that there is, and he claims there is a 
condition which exists in that parking lot, 
ng, construction where it was negligently 
constructed, where they made something that was 
negligent 
result of 
location 
alleges i 
or defective and that people have fallen as a 
that, then I would allow prior falls. 
If these prior falls are not in that same 
as far as the depressed area of which he 
s defective, such as going down the ramp or 
such as the other part of it, I just can't allow it. 
They are 
concerned 
may have 
condition 
just not relevant as far as the situation is 
They may have fallen, and even some of them 
been five or ten years ago. 
But if he can tie it in to a defective 
in construction, something of a negligent 
nature, then I will allow it within the same area. And 
it sounds 
and that1 
like to me there is only one that does this, 
s the one on the west side of where somebody 
walked out in back of their car and fell. 
And I won't even allow that unless it can be 
shown that there was a defect as far as the construction 
which caused ice to form and people have been falling 
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there. 
didnft 
out and 
Of course that's even weak because still they 
give notice to the principle, Wasatch Manor. 
If they had been given notice and didn't go 
do anything to correct it, that's the bad thing, 
And that's where it really becomes material. So what I 
am saying is if they didn't give notice. 
you do 
I notice. 
saying 
can be 
there a 
defect! 
of clar 
argued. 
in time 
defect! 
parking 
I know Mr. Hayes what he is going to do if 
put them on and establishes that there was no 
So I hope you understand my ruling. I am 
that I will not allow the prior falls unless it 
established that there was a defective condition 
nd they were falling as a result of that 
ve engineered condition. 
MR. HAYES: Thank you, your Honor. 
MR. BJORKLUND: Could I ask for just a point 
ification, your Honor, not a point intended to be 
THE COURT: Sure. 
MR. BJORKLUND: We do not intend at this point 
to introduce evidence showing that it was 
vely constructed, but that the maintenance of the 
lot in terms of piling the snow around the 
perimeter and the subsequent salting could -- created an 
on-goin 
1 Court ' s 
g dangerous condition. Now, I understand the 
ruling is a dangerous condition regarding the 
5 
construction. We are saying, okay, itfs a parking lot 
that's constructed the way it is. Their negligence was 
piling the snow the way they did all the way through the 
winter and failing to salt. Does that fall within the 
same kind of dangerous condition? 
THE COURT: No. I could not allow that of 
where you talk of a fall of 15 -- 10, 15, 18 years ago. 
There is no way that it can be tied in that that was 
plowed the same way and the same type of conditions 
existed. And I would not allow it. Does that clear it 
up? 
MR. HAYES: Thank you, your Honor. I'll 
prepare the order. 
THE COURT: You prepare the order. 
(This concludes the bench ruling.) 
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APPENDIX "B" 
Eric W. Bjorklund #0345 
Attorney at Law 
3808 South West Temple, Suite ID 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
(801) 262-9904 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
GUY ERICKSON, : 
Plaintiff, : AFFIDAVIT OF 
JODY CHRISTENSEN 
VS. : 
WASATCH MANOR, INC. : Civil No. C86-845 
Judge Wilkinson 
Defendant. : 
Jody Christensen, having first been sworn on oath deposes and hereby 
states as follows: 
1. If called upon to testify in the above captioned matter her testimony 
would be as follows: 
2. She was an employee at the Salt Lake Assessor's office during the 
1984-1985 winter (Nov 1984 - March 1985) and parked at the Wasatch Manor 
parking lot during said time. 
3. That the location of her parking slot is marked by the words MParking 
Place" on Exhibit A attached hereto which is a drawing of the Wasatch Manor 
appartment's upper level parking lot. 
4. That she parked in said parking lot at least three times a week. 
5. That she traveled a course indicated by the dotted line on the attached 
Exhibit A when she would arive in the morning between 7:30 a.m. and 8:00 a.m. 
1 
and when she would leave work at night between 5:00 p.m. and 5:45 p.m.. 
6. That during the winter of 1984-85 she observed the conditions along 
the dotted line and throughout the parking lot as it relates to ice. 
7. That during the winter of 1984-85 she observed that the parking lot 
and the route along the dotted line were usually covered with ice and that she 
considered the parking lot to be dangerous and negligently maintained. 
8. That during the winter of 1984-85 she observed the conditions along 
the dotted line and throughout the parking lot as it relates to the existence of 
salting. 
9. That during the winter of 1984-85 she observed that the parking lot 
was rarely, if ever, salted. 
10. That during the last two weeks of December, 1984 or during the 
month of January, 1985 she fell at the location marked "Fall" on the attached 
Exhibit A. 
11. That she fell on black ice which was the same in appearance as that 
ice that often observed along the dotted line and that she fell notwithstanding 
her attempts to be reasonably cautious* 
12. That she was aware of the Wasatch Manor's parking lot's reputation 
for ice or danger during the winter of 1984-85 among the employees of the 
County Assessor's office. 
13. That the Wasatch Manor parking lot had a reputation as a dangeous 
and icy place. 
13. That within days after the affiant's fall she talked with the Wasatch 
Manor manager and indicated that the parking lot was unreasonably icy, that she 
had fallen and that she would like to have permission to go through the foyer 
instead of down the ramps when entering and leaving the parking lot. 
2 
14. That she did not recal many of the facts indicated above at her 
deposition in this matter. She did not understand what the deposition was about 
prior to giving it and had not had any opportunity to consult her records or 
to talk with others to attempt to refresh her recollection. 
Dated this S& '- day of May, 1989. 
Y CH&STENSEN 
OJ ,'*-*-*! L*r1~ 
JOD  
/ / NORTARY 
On this / U) day of May, 1989, appeared before me JODY 
CHRISTENS EN and affirmed the foregoing. 
Commission Exists: 
Notary Address: ^ ^ ^ 
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APPENDIX "C" 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO 20 
The defendant has a duty to exercise ordinary case to 
maintain the common walkways in reasonably safe condition for 
tenants and guests. The defendant has a further duty to 
observe any dangerous condition known to him or which by the 
use of reasonable diligence would have become known to him and 
to take reasonable steps to remedy or remove any such dangerous 
condition. 
However, the landlord is not a guarantor for the 
safety of his tenants as they proceed along the common ways. 
The mere accumulation of ice does not automatically 
make the landlord liable. He must be given a reasonable time 
after the creation of the dangerous condition developed, to 
take such measures as will make the common areas reasonably 
safe from those conditions which pose an unreasonable risk of 
harm to the user. 
APPENDIX "D1 
JUN 1 3 1989 
Eric W. Bjorklund #0345 ,
 c& rr 
Attorney at Law v ^ ^ 
3808 South West Temple. Suite ID By-.iiJ I~I ^ ^ 5iS*»«** 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 262-9904 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OP SALT LAKE, STATE OP UTAH 
GUY ERICKSON, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
WASATCH MANOR, INC. 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C86-845 
Judge Wilkinson 
The trial of this matter was held on May 16, 1989 through and including 
May 19, 1989 before an eight member jury, the Honorable Homer Wilkinson, 
presiding. The Plaintiff, Guy Erickson was present and represented by his 
counsel, Eric W. Bjorklund. The director of the Defendant, Wasatch Manor, 
Burton Miller, was present, together with the Defendant's counsel, Nelson Hayes 
and Masuda A. Medcalf. 
The jury, after due deliberation, entered a judgment in favor of the 
Plaintiff and against the Defendant for negligence and awarded damages to the 
Plaintiff as follows: medical expenses of $9,820.15, lost income of $45,000.00 and 
general damages of $30,000.00, for a total award of $84,820.15 
THEREFORE, JUDGMENT IS GRANTED, in favor of the plaintiff as follows: 
1. Payment of special damages for the Plaintiff's medical expenses of 
$9,820.15 and for the Plaintiff's lost income of $45,000.00. 
2. Payment of general damages of $30,000.00. 
3. Payment of the Plaintiff's court costs in the amount of t 7 ' *-
4* Payment of interest at the statutory rate from the date of entry of the 
judgment. ^ _ ^ 
DATED this /J day o» ta* , 1989. 
CERTIFICATE OP HAND DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Judgment was hand 
delivered, to Nelson L Hayes, CAB Towers, Suite_700. 50 South Main Street, P.O. 
Box 2465, Salt Lake Wty, Utah 84LW, this 'ZlvW day May, 1989. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
..*'* 
A„-
ERICKSON, GUY 
PLAINTIFF 
VS 
WASATCH MANOR, INC 
DEFENDANT 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NUMBER 860900845 CV 
DATE 08/07/89 
HONORABLE HOMER F WILKINSON 
COURT REPORTER 
COURT CLERK DAG 
TYPE OF HEARING: 
PRESENT: 
P. ATTY. BJORKLUND, ERIC W. 
D. ATTY. HAYES, NELSON L. 
4-501 RULING 
PURSUANT TO DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR RULING ON DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL DATED JULY 27, 1989, THE COURT HAVING RE-
VIEWED THE FILE AND READ THE PLEADINGS RULES AS FOLLOWS: 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL IS DENIED. 
CC NELSON HAYES, MASUDA MEDCALF, ERIC BJORKLUND 
